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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Gary Wayne Mallory, 11, appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury 
verdicts finding him guilty of first-degree murder and felony domestic battery of 
his wife, Charlene. Mallory contends the district court erred in denying his motion 
to preclude the medical examiner from testifying about her observation during the 
autopsy that Charlene had old rib fractures. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
At around 11 :30 a.m. on Valentine's Day in 2009, Officer Zachary Ward 
was on patrol when he saw an individual, later identified as Tim Feldman, wave 
him to the side of the road. (Tr.1, Vol. II, p.602, L.22 - p.604, L.7.) Officer Ward 
approached Mr. Feldman who asked him if he was "there for a dead body call," 
which Mr. Feldman had just reported to 911. (Tr., Vol. II, p.604, Ls.9-15.) 
Although Officer Ward had not been advised of the report from dispatch when he 
first made contact with Mr. Feldman, he received the call as he was "headed 
toward the residence" to which Mr. Feldman was directing him. (Tr., Vol. II, 
p.604, L.16 - p.605, L.1.) Mr. Feldman told Officer Ward that "the deceased 
person" was Mallory's wife, later identified as Charlene, and that Mallory was 
down there with her, and that he believed Mallory killed her. (Tr., Vol. 11, p.605, 
Ls.9-16; p.610, Ls.11-12.) 
1 There are three transcripts included in the record on appeal - a transcript of the 
sentencing hearing and a two-volume transcript that contains jury selection, 
motion hearings, and the trial. All references to "Tr." in this appeal will be to the 
latter two volumes. 
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Officer Ward went in the residence and walked downstairs where he found 
Charlene and Mallory in the bedroom on the bed. (Tr., Vol. II, p.610, Ls.15-17.) 
Charlene appeared to have been dead long enough for rigor mortis to set in, and 
Officer Ward checked her pulse and confirmed that she was. (Tr., Vol. II, p.611, 
L.25 - p.612, L.7; p.613, L.22 - p.614, L.14.) Officer Ward took Mallory outside 
and attempted to interview him to determine what happened. (Tr., Vol. II, p.615, 
Ls.5-16.) As Officer Ward was walking outside with Mallory, Mallory asked for a 
cigarette prior to going to jail. (Tr., Vol. 11, p.615, Ls.19-21.) Officer Ward thought 
this was unusual since he had not asked any "interrogation-type questions at that 
point." (Tr., Vol. 11, p.615, Ls.21-22.) Mallory would not answer questions from 
Officer Ward as to why he thought he was going to jail, but repeated his request 
for a cigarette several times. (Tr., Vol. II, p.615, L.25 - p.616, L.9.) Mallory also 
declined to sit in the lawn chair as directed by Officer Ward, instead getting down 
on his knees in a "takedown position" with his hands behind his back. (Tr., Vol. 
II, p.616, L.13- p.617, L.4.) 
Mallory eventually gave conflicting accounts to Officer Ward about the 
night preceding Charlene's murder. (Tr., Vol. II, p.617, L.12 - p.620, L.5.) 
Although Officer Ward noted Charlene appeared to have been dead for some 
time, one of Mallory's claims was that Charlene was talking to him and telling him 
she loved him just prior to Officer Ward's arrival. (Tr., Vol. II, p.618, Ls.10-16.) 
Mallory was subsequently transported to the jail for further questioning and later 
arrested for murder. (Tr., Vol. II, p.622, Ls.1-21; p.629, Ls.8-11.) 
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An autopsy performed by Dr. Sally Aiken revealed that Charlene died from 
manual strangulation and that she also suffered multiple contusions, several 
fractured ribs, and a dislocated joint between her body and arm. (See generally 
Tr., Vol. II, pp.769-810.) The state charged Mallory with first-degree murder and 
felony domestic battery. (R., Vol. I, pp.42-43, 52-53.) 
Prior to trial, Mallory filed a motion in /imine seeking to prevent Dr. Aiken, 
or any other witness "from testifying that observation of the decedent's body 
revealed evidence of prior internal (rib) injuries." (R., Vol. I, p.197.) The basis of 
Mallory's motion was that such evidence was inadmissible pursuant to I.R.E. 403 
and 404(b). (R. Vol. I, p.197.) The court conducted a hearing on Mallory's 
motion in limine at which it denied Mallory's request to exclude evidence of the 
fact that Charlene had an old rib fracture. (Tr., Vol. I, p.85, L.16 - p.89, L.18; 
p.112, Ls.6-20; p.120, Ls.3-16.) 
The case proceeded to trial after which a jury found Mallory guilty of both 
first-degree murder and felony domestic battery. (R., Vol. II, pp.271-272.) The 
court imposed a unified life sentence with twenty-eight years fixed for first-degree 
murder and a consecutive two-year fixed sentence for felony domestic battery. 




Mallory states the issues on appeal as: 
Did the district court err by denying the motion in limine regarding 
the evidence of prior injuries? 
(Opening Brief of Appellant ("Appellant's Brief'), p.10.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Mallory failed to show that evidence of the victim's prior rib fractures 
qualified as a prior crime, wrong, or act subject to exclusion under I.R.E. 404(b) 
or that the evidence should have been excluded pursuant to I.R.E. 403? 
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ARGUMENT 
Mallory Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred In Denying His Motion 
To Preclude The Medical Examiner From Referring To The Fact That The Victim 
Had "Old" Rib Fractures 
A. Introduction 
Mallory contends the district court erred in allowing the medical examiner 
to comment that Charlene had old rib fractures, claiming such evidence was 
inadmissible prior bad act evidence. (Appellant's Brief, pp.10-12.) Mallory's 
claim fails because the fact of Charlene's old rib fractures does not constitute a 
prior crime, wrong or act subject to exclusion under I.RE. 404(b). 
Mallory also asserts the district court erred by "fail[ingJ to correctly balance 
the probative value of the evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.13.) Application of the correct legal standards demonstrates 
this claim fails as well because it relies on the faulty premise that the evidence 
was impermissible under I.R.E. 404(b). 
B. Standard Of Review 
Rulings under I.RE. 404(b) are reviewed under a bifurcated standard: 
whether the evidence is admissible for a purpose other than propensity is given 
free review while the determination of whether the probative value of the 
evidence is substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 51, 205 P.3d 
1185, 1187 (2009). When the appellate court reviews an evidentiary ruling for 
abuse of discretion, it conducts "a multi-tiered inquiry, examining 1) whether the 
lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion, 2) whether the court 
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acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any 
legal standards applicable to specific choices, and 3) whether the court reached 
its decision by an exercise of reason." State v. Hoak, 147 Idaho 919, 921, 216 
P.3d 1291, 1293 (Ct. App. 2009) (citation omitted). 
C. Mallory Has Failed To Show Any Basis For Reversal Based On The 
District Court's Ruling That The Medical Examiner Could Comment On 
The Fact That The Victim Had Old Rib Fractures 
Mallory argues that the district court erred in allowing Dr. Sally Aiken, the 
medical examiner who performed the autopsy on Charlene, to testify as to her 
finding that Charlene had old rib fractures. (Appellant's Brief, pp.10-12.) 
According to Mallory, admission of this testimony violated I.R.E. 404(b) because, 
he argues, as he did below, that the "natural inference of the evidence" was that 
Mallory caused the injuries but because there was no evidence presented as to 
whether the fractures were accidental or "intentionally inflicted" by Mallory, "there 
is no legal relevance." (Appellant's Brief, p.11.) Mallory's argument fails under 
the plain language of I.R.E. 404(b). 
Rule 404(b), I.R.E., provides, in relevant part, that "[e]vidence of other 
crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in 
order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith." The very language 
Mallory employs to make his argument demonstrates its fundamental flaw, i.e., 
there was no evidence presented that Mallory caused the injuries. Thus, there 
was no evidence of any crime, wrong, or act committed by Mallory that would be 
subject to exclusion under the rule, and the fact of an old rib fracture certainly 
does not qualify as such. Mallory's argument ignores this point by asking the 
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Court to find error based not on the evidence presented, but on an inference he 
draws (and contends the jury drew) from the evidence presented. Rule 404(b) is, 
however, designed to prevent actual evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts, it 
is not designed to prevent juries from speculating about evidence not presented. 
Mallory has failed to establish that admission of Charlene's old rib fractures 
violated I.R.E. 404(b). 
Mallory also claims the district court abused its discretion in balancing the 
probative value of the evidence of Charlene's old rib fractures against the danger 
of unfair prejudice. (Appellant's Brief, p.13.) Specifically, Mallory asserts that 
"since the trial court did not see the issue as one implicating I.R.E. 404(b), it did 
not identify a proper purpose for the 404(b) character evidence." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.14.) Thus, Mallory concludes, the court "did not act consistently with the 
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it when it denied 
the motion in limine." (Appellant's Brief, p.14.) This argument fails because it is 
predicated on the false premise that the "issue [w]as one implicating I.R.E. 
404(b)." Because I.R.E. 404(b) was not implicated by evidence of the fact that 
Charlene had old rib fractures, Mallory's claim that the court abused its discretion 
by failing to identify a "proper purpose" under I.RE. 404(b) for admission of 
evidence of the old rib fractures fails. 
Although it does not appear that Mallory claims an abuse of discretion 
under I.R.E. 403 beyond his claim that the weighing was improper assuming 
application of I.R.E. 404(b), to the extent he is making such an argument, it also 
fails. Relevant evidence is admissible unless otherwise excluded. I.R.E. 402. 
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Evidence that tends to prove the existence of a fact of consequence in the case, 
and has any tendency to make the existence of that fact more probable than it 
would be without the evidence is relevant. State v. Hocker, 115 Idaho 544, 547, 
768 P.2d 807, 810 (Ct. App. 1989). Even if relevant, evidence may be excluded 
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. I.R.E. 403. 
Dr. Aiken's discussion regarding the autopsy and her resulting findings 
was relevant in that it provided the basis for her opinion on Charlene's cause of 
death and injuries she suffered near the time of death, both of which were 
necessary to the state's burden of proving first-degree murder by strangulation 
and felony domestic battery. While Mallory is correct that Dr. Aiken testified that 
none of Charlene's rib fractures, old or new, were the cause of death such that 
the timing of those fractures was not relevant to the cause of death (Appellant's 
Brief, pp.11-12), that does not mean the evidence was not relevant. To the 
contrary, the evidence was relevant because it provided foundation for the 
entirety of the autopsy and allowed Dr. Aiken to distinguish between the old 
fractures and the new fractures that formed the basis for the domestic battery 
charge. 
Evidence of the old rib fractures was also not unfairly prejudicial. While a 
juror could theoretically speculate that Mallory may have caused the old rib 
fractures, that was not the purpose for which the evidence was offered and, as 
Mallory concedes, the state did not attempt to prove that he was the cause of 
those fractures. Moreover, the jury was instructed, as most juries are, that its 
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finding of guilt must be based "only on the evidence admitted in this trial," 
consisting of "the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits offered and received, 
and any stipulated or admitted facts." (R., Vol. II, p.277; see also p.281.) In 
addition, Dr. Aiken's testimony on direct examination in relation to the old rib 
fractures consisted of one paragraph in pages of testimony regarding her 
autopsy findings. (Tr., Vol. II, p.791, Ls.12-19.) Dr. Aiken's testimony on cross-
examination virtually eliminated any conceivable prejudice relating to her brief 
testimony on direct in that Mallory elicited testimony from her that she had no 
opinion on when the old rib fractures occurred or how they occurred. (Tr., Vol. II, 
p.827, L.20 - p.828, L.11.) The prejudicial value of evidence of Charlene's old 
rib fractures, when considered in context, falls far short of meeting the standard 
for unfair prejudice, which has been defined as evidence that "inflames the jury 
and rouses them to 'overmastering hostility."' State v. Gauna, 117 Idaho 83, 88, 
785 P.2d 647, 652 (Ct. App. 1989). Based on that standard, any prejudice 
arising from evidence that Charlene had fractured her ribs at some unknown time 
in the past by some unknown mechanism is nearly non-existent. 
Even if this Court finds error in the admission of evidence that Charlene 
had old rib fractures, any such error was harmless. "An error is harmless if the 
reviewing court is able to declare beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did 
not contribute to the verdict." State v. Marmentini, --- P.3d ----, 2011 WL 
6144987 *3 (2011) (citing State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 219-220, 245 P.3d 961, 
971-972 (2010)). 
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In addition to the reasons set forth above regarding why the evidence was 
not unfairly prejudicial, any error was also harmless given the weight of the 
evidence against Mallory, including his statements and behavior both before and 
after the murder. (See, ~. Tr., Vol. II, pp.614-620 (Officer Ward testifying 
about Mallory's reaction when he arrived and his inconsistent stories); pp.905-
930 (Larry Shaffer testifying that he saw Mallory and Charlene on February 13, 
2009, Mallory had been drinking, pushed Charlene against the truck, and told Mr. 
Shaffer that he was going to kill Charlene if she didn't "straighten up"); p.932, L.9 
- p.934, L.10 (Terry Bailey testifying that she saw Mallory between 7:00 and 8:00 
a.m. on February 14, 2009, at Overtime bar, and heard Mallory say he had done 
"something bad"); p.968, L.10 - p.969, L.15 (Lee Mowery testifying that he saw 
Mallory on February 14, 2009, at around 9:00 a.m. at Overtime bar and Mallory 
said he might have done "something wrong"). Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that 
what tipped the jury's verdicts against Mallory was the passing reference to 
Charlene's old rib fractures rather than all of the other evidence of Mallory's guilt 
and the brutal beating and strangulation Mallory inflicted on Charlene on 
February 14, 2009 (see Exhibits 1 D, 3A, 38, 3C). In light of the evidence 
presented, this Court can declare, beyond a reasonable doubt, that evidence of 
Charlene's old rib fractures, if error, did not contribute to the verdict. 
Mallory has failed to establish the district court abused its discretion in 
admitting evidence of the fact that Charlene had old rib fractures. Even if Mallory 




The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered 
upon the jury verdict finding Mallory guilty of first-degree murder and felony 
domestic violence. 
DATED this 28th day of December, 2011. 
JESSIQA M. LORELLO 
Deputy-' Attorney General 
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